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TAPOL's twentieth anniversary 
Twenty years ago this month, in August 1973, TAPOL was founded with the publication of its first 
two-monthly Bulletin. Our 11 Bth issue is a good opportunity to take stock of how the human rights 
situation in Indonesia has evolved since then and how TAPOL has adjusted to these developments. 
This is hardly an occasion for celebration. Many of the 
basics in Indonesia have not changed. The military regime 
that came to power in 1965/66 under General Suharto is 
still a fact of life although relations between Suharto and 
the armed forces (ABRI) have been re-shaped by rivalries 
over the sharing of power. Suharto remains in charge, 
having begun his sixth term earlier this year. He is one of 
the longest-serving dictators in the world. 
When it first started, TAPOL was called the British 
Campaign for the Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners. 
The name was intended to focus on the fate of the many 
tens of thousands of tapo{ (tahanan politik, or political 
prisoner) still being held, the vast majority without charge 
or trial, following the violent crackdown against the 
Indonesian Communist Party and the left-wing movement 
in general which started in October 1965. As many as half 
a million people were rounded up across the country, as 
army hordes carried out and incited massacres which left up 
to a million people dead by the time Suharto ·formally 
grabbed power from President Sukarno in March 1966. 
TAPOL also highlighted the injustices of the many political 
trials which resulted in dozens of death sentences and 
severe sentences against hundreds more. 
Within six months of TAPOL's birth, an army crackdown 
against a mass-based student movement in January 1974 
gave birth to a new generation of tapol. Since then, TAPOL 
has campaigned on behalf of Indonesian political prisoners 
of all political hues. In particular, it closely monitored the 
scores of trials which put hundreds of Muslims behind bars, 
follpwing the army massacre in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta on 
12 September 1984. Other massacres have peppered the 
whole period, the dead-squads that operated in 1983/84, the 
Lampung massacre in February 1989 and the killing of 
several thousand people in Aceh, to mention but a few. 
Faced with mounting international pressure, the 
Indonesian military regime, condemned as one of the worst 
human rights off enders worldwide, released the vast 
majority of untried tapol in the late 1970s but to this day, 
nearly a million and a half so-called 'ex communist 
prisoners' have few civil rights, while dozens remain in 
prison serving life sentences or awaiting execution. 
A broader campaign 
It soon became obvious that TAPOL would have to take on 
board a much wider range of issues, not only human rights 
abuses of all kinds within Indonesia proper but also the 
rights of people living in territories who reject Indonesian 
rule. As early as January 1974, it began reporting atrocities 
in West Papua, which was annexed by Indonesia in 1963. 
During that same year, as East Timor (then still known as 
Portuguese Timor) stood on the brink of an act of self-
determination, the Suharto regime began flexing its muscles 
for an onslaught, culminating in the invasion in December 
1975 which has brought incalculable loss of life and 
suffering to the people of East Timor. Since then, mass 
killings and atrocities have engulfed the people of Aceh, a 
situation that TAPOL was among the very first to draw 
attention to. 
In March 1980, TAPOL's sub-title was changed to th~ 
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British Campaign for the Defence of Political Prisoners and 
Human Rights in Indonesia. Six years later this was again 
changed to its present name, the Indonesia Human Rights 
Campaign, reflecting the fact that the organisation has since 
then functioned more as an mternatmnal tnan- a purely 
British campaign. But TAPOL has remained our masthead, 
for historic reasons as well as to stress that campaigning for 
political prisoners still continues to be our main focus. 
Throughout the early years of its existence, TAPOL was 
unable to form alliances with human rights groups in 
Indonesia; having been branded by the regime as 'pro-
communist', not a 'pure' human rights organisation, it 
became an 'untouchable' for most people in Indonesia where 
any hint of sympathy for 'communist tapoJs' was extremely 
risky. Things began to change in the early eighties. The 
appearance of a TAPOL book, Indonesia: Muslims on Trial 
in April 1987 (which has been translated into Indonesian) 
was seen by many groups in Indonesia as the final proof -
if such was needed - that TAPOL does not restrict itself to 
defending only communist prisoners. Today, TAPOL enjoys 
close relations with many human rights activists and groups 
and with the pro-democracy movement in general. 
A TAPOL demo in 1990 in front of Australia House in London, 
protesting against the Timor Gap Treaty. 
What is it that distinguishes TAPOL from other human 
rights organisations like Amnesty International and Asia 
Watch which also campaign on Indonesia? First we are tiny 
by comparison, employing a smaller staff even than they 
can employ for Indonesia-related action and research. 
However, the range of ~ues goes far beyond what they can 
do because of their carefully-defined mandates. TAPOL's 
mandate is limited only in the sense that it regards any 
human rights abuses perpetrated by the Indonesian military 
regime, whether in Indonesia itself or against liberation 
struggles, as its legitimate concern. 
Because of a heavy involvement with the situation in East 
Timor, TAPOL has become part of the global East Timor 
solidarity movement. It also set up and still facilitates an 
electronic-mail conference on East Timor which has 
become a prime source of up-to-date news. On West 
Papua, the TAPOL publication, West Papua: The Obliter-
ation of a People, ran into three editions and is still selling 
well. 
Campaigning against foreign support 
It has always been a primary concern of TAPOL to exert 
pressure on governments to stop aiding and abetting the 
Indonesian military regime, either by supplying equipment 
to its armed forces or providing economic aid. Indeed, our 
very first action in London was a campaign in June 1973 to 
protest against the meeting that month of the Inter-Gov-
ernmental Group on Indonesia which has, since 1967, 
allocated increasing sums of money to keep the regime 
afloat. This aligned the organisation with the principle that 
has now become known as 'conditionality', establishing 
linkage between foreign economic assistance and the 
recipient country's human rights conduct. 
TAPOL's initial taste of campaigning against armaments 
manufacturers came in April 1978 when British Aerospace 
announced its first deal to supply ABRI with Hawk 
ground-attack aircraft, at a time when the war against East 
Timor was at its height. Since then, in collaboration with 
campaigners against the arms trade in the UK and else-
where, TAPOL has exposed and condemned all those -
exporting companies and governments alike - who put 
profit before principle, arming the armed forces which are 
responsible for so many massacres and atrocities, in 
Indonesia as well as in Aceh, East Timor and West Papua. 
Human rights campaigners should never eount their 
successes in terms of the number of people released or a 
fall in the numbers killed or who 'disappear'. Unfortunately, 
for as long as the regime that was created by Suharto and 
ABRI remains in existence, such statistics mean little 
because new generations of victims take the place of earlier 
generations and the repressive apparatus remains in place. 
If TAPOL can claim any success, it lies in the fact that it 
has added its mite to a situation today in which Suharto's 
Indonesia cannot escape the scrutiny of the world commun-
ity. This is the collective achievement of many NGOs and 
groups, and above all of the victims of the Suharto regime 
whose courage and fortitude have been our constant 
inspiration. ii 
Timor at UN Decolonisation Committee 
The UN Decolonisation Committee meeting in New York 
on 13 July this year heard petitions on East Timor from 21 
NGOs and individuals. Besides four Portuguese MPs from 
all the main parties, the following spoke at the Committee: 
The National Coun.cil for Maubere Resistance, Dan Heap 
MP (C-anada), East Timor .Action Network-USA, TAP04 
Agir pour Timor, Amnesty International, Asia Watch, 
Komitee Indonesie, Prof. Roger Clark, International 
Platform of Jurists for East Timor, East Timor Alert 
Network-Canada, FRETIUN, Pax Christi, British Coalition 
for East Timor, Free East Timor Japan Coalition, Bishop 
Soma (Japan) and the Catholic Institute for International 
Relations. 
The Tunisian member of the Committee, in a departure 
from procedure in previous years, questioned the integrity 
of several petitioners by imputing that their concerns about 
human rights did not extend beyond East Timor. 
TAPOL's submission which, as on previous occasions, 
dealt with the nature of the military operation in East 
Timor, is published as Occaswnal Reports No. 22. lf 
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East Timorese refused diplomatic protection 
On 23 June, seven East Timorese who have been on the run from the army since the Santa Cruz 
massacre in November 1991 sought protection at the Finnish and Swedish embassies in Jakarta but 
both embassies were anxious to get them off the premises as quickly as possible so as not to endanger 
their profitable business ties with Indonesia. 
Four of the men, Clementino Faria, Manuel Brito Xime-
nes, Oscar Goncalves da Silva and Venture Valentino de 
Conceicao, sought protection at the Finnish embassy, while 
the other three, Florencio Anunciacao Fernandes, Pro-
firio da Costa Oliveira and Jose Manuel de Oliveira 
Sousa went into the Swedish embassy. All are between the 
ages of 20 and 27. 
The tw:o embassies are situated in the same office block 
in central Jakarta, on different floors. Access is by lift to 
the respective corridors, with glass walls enclosing the front 
reception rooms. Throughout the asylum bids, there were 
troops on guard in the corridors where extra-territorial 
rights do not apply. 
Although the Timorese took documents explaining why 
they had decided in desperation to seek protection and help 
to leave Indonesia as quickly as possible, the staff in both 
embassies showed no sympathy for their plight. From the 
start, they did everything . possible to persuade them to leave 
their premises. The East Timorese were told that Finland 
and Sweden could not, by law, grant asylum at their 
embassies; they could only do so once a refugee had 
arrived on their home territory. 
In actual fact, the East Timorese did not need political 
asylum as they are all Portuguese citizens. They needed 
safe passage out of the country; once abroad, they are 
entitled to Portuguese passports. But even this turned out to 
be too much to ask of their unwilling Finnish and Swedish 
hosts. Considering that Sweden in particular has granted 
political asylum to so many people facing persecution, 
including Acehnese and West Papuans, their hostile attitude 
towards these young fugitives from Indonesian terror is hard 
to comprehend. Swedish protestations about not granting 
asylum on embassy premises sounded hollow; a very large 
number of Chileans on the run from the Pinochet regime in 
the 1970s were helped out of the country after taking refuge 
at the Swedish embassy in Santiago. 
Worthless military 'assurances' 
As soon as the Timorese arrived at the embassies, the 
Indonesian authorities started exertmg pressure, in the 
person of Major-General Hendro Priyono, military com-
mander of the Jakarta military commander. He was a 
frequent visitor to the embassies, spending as long as four 
hours at a stretch, persuading the staff of the army's good 
intentions. Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials were 
nowhere to be seen. Suharto's recently-appointed 'roving 
ambassador' for East Timor affairs, Lopes da Cruz, was also 
recruited to put pressure on the seven. Acting as a mediator 
was Indonesian human rights activist, Haji J.C. Princen. 
Conditions for the four at the Finnish embassy were 
particularly oppressive. They were prevented from entering 
the embassy proper and kept in a reception-room, separated 
only by a glass wall from troops who were on guard. 
Within 24 hours, the four East Timorese had been prevailed 
The seven asylum seekers. Top row: L to R: Mateus Brito 
Ximenes, Jose Manuel da Oliveira Sousa, Oscar Goncalves, 
Clementino Faria. Bottom row: Ventura Valentim, Profirio da 
Costa, Oliveira, Florencio Anunciacao Fernandes 
upon to leave. They were given no written assurances of 
any kind. The document they signed says merely, "We are 
leaving the embassy of our own free will" after joint 
discussions with the above-mentioned officials and the 
Finnish ambassador. They were taken to the Jakarta home 
of Lopes da Cruz, whose role as top-ranking Indonesian 
collaborator goes back to the days when he signed the 
treacherous 'Balibo Statement' on 30 November 1975, 
begging Indonesia to take over East Timor. 
The three at the Swedish embassy held out for ten days, 
insisting all the time that they wanted to leave Indonesia. 
Throughout their stay, the Swedish embassy staff were 
under strict instructions not to permit the East Timorese to 
communicate with the outside world or to receive phone-
calls. While Princen acted as mediator, Hendro Priyono and 
the Swedish charge d'affaires collaborated closely to force 
the men to leave the embassy, jointly drafting a statement 
that they would be required to sign. The extent of this 
collaboration was revealed in a letter addressed to TAPOL, 
signed by the three, which was smuggled out of the 
embassy halfway through their stay there: 
Since we have been at the embassy, several intelligence 
agents have been intimidating us and threatening us outside 
the door... with offensive words like Timur inananhuir 
cukimai' .... We are not being treated in accordance with the 
provisions of Articles 14 and 15 of the Universal Declar-
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ation of Human Rights. All the time the military and the 
Swedish embassy are insisting that we sign a statement that 
they have drawn up but we have persisted in refusing to do 
so. 
After saying that they were not in good health, they ended 
with the words: "Please do all you can to try to get us out 
of Indonesia safely." 
The UNHCR's unhelpful role 
The three also accused the local UN High Commission for 
Refugees representative of putting pressure on them to sign 
a statement . prepared by the embassy staff and the military. 
In an interview later with a Jakarta daily, the agency's 
representative in Jakarta, David Jamieson, insisted that the 
UNHCR has no role to play in such an affair, arguing that 
it could not intervene on behalf of persons claiming refugee 
status "when they are in their own country". This contra-
diets the UN's official position which has never accepted 
Indonesia's claim to have integrated East Timor; the UN's 
position means that East Timorese in Indonesia are in a 
foreign country and are therefore eligible for consideration 
as refugees under the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees. 
A change in UNHCR policy is certainly called for and is 
understood to be under consideration. 
TJie three in the Swedish Embassy: From L to R: Profirio da 
Costa Oliveira, Florencio Anunciacao Fernandes and Jose 
Manuel da Oliveira Sousa. 
Although they remained resolute, the three in the end 
decided to leave the · Swedish embassy, primarily because 
they were given to believe that they would be able to leave 
Indonesia with the assistance the International Red Cross 
(ICRC) which has helped many East Timorese go abroad 
either for family re-unification or for humanitarian reasons. 
The statement they were required to sign guarantees that 
they will "not be subject to any persecution, interrogation, 
intimidation or arrest or similar action as a consequence of 
(a) their stay at the Swedish embassy, or (b) their actions in 
the past, with the exception of any criminal offence covered 
by the Indonesian Criminal Code (KUHP) such as theft, 
rape or the like". It was also agreed that the three "shall 
have full freedom to contact Mr Princen and the Swedish 
embassy at any time with a view to assuring the proper 
functioning of this agreement". 
The three were taken to the home of Haji Princen and 
have been under his protection ever since. The tiny house 
where Princen lives has been under constant surveillance by 
'intel' agents who have made many intrusions into the 
house. One intrusion occurred when an Australian television 
cameraman went there to interview the three · Timorese; the 
troops tried unsuccessfully to confiscate the tape. On 
another occasion, the three returned home from an outing 
with Princen to find a soldier in their room. Although 
complaints have been made to the Swedish embassy, it has 
Jed only to a temporary relaxation, with the spies moving 
a short distance away but still lurking in the vicinity. 
In July, Princen was able to take the four Timorese away 
from the home of Lopes da Cruz. where they were living 
like prisoners and moved them to Cililitan, under the 
protection of a Dutch Catholic priest. 
All seven have registered their names at the Jakarta office 
of the ICRC to leave Indonesia and the agency has accepted 
responsibility to work towards that goal. As in all cases of 
departure under the ICRC programme, approval of the 
Indonesian government is required. All seven, along with 
Princen, are resigned to the fact that this will take time. In 
the meanwhile, they are living a very precarious existence. 
"A piece of engineering" 
For Jakarta, the asylum bid came as a slap in the face. East 
Timor was again making headlines in the Indonesian press, 
with more evidence of deep-rooted unrest in Indonesia's 
'27th province'. People like Foreign Minister Ali Alatas 
tried to discredit the asylum bid as a "piece of engineering" 
[direkayasa, which implies that the persons concerned are 
being manipulated by unseen forces]. Caught unawares 
while still in Vienna for the UN World Conference on 
Human Rights, Alatas accused Amnesty International of all 
people of being behind it. His proof? That within hours, 
they had been able to produce a one-page urgent action! 
He also wondered how Portuguese journalists could have 
been phoning him for his reactions even before he had 
heard about the affair from Jakarta. He alleged, "They want 
to blacken Indonesia's name, to comer us". [Kompas, 
26.Vl.1993] 
Another 'explanation' came from Major-General Hendro 
Priyono who told Forum Keadilan that Jose Ramos-Horta 
was the 'engineer' · because he was phoning the asylum-
seekers at the Swedish embassy every day and telling them 
what to do. (In actual fact, the embassy staff, as Hendro 
knows very well, would not allow the Timorese to take any 
phone-calls.] 
Business interests take precedence 
After the Swedish embassy had rid itself of the three 
Timorese, the charge d'affaires went out of his way to thank 
the Jakarta military commander for his "cooperative 
collaboration even to the extent that the military com-
mander himself took a personal hand in the matter". [Media 
Indonesia, 6.VII.1993] 
The unseemly eagerness of the Swedish and Finnish 
embassies to get rid of their unwanted guests can only be 
explained by the two countries' extensive business interests 
in Indonesia. According to Stockholm-based journalist 
Alfred de Tavares, the asylum bid. could hardly have come 
at a more embarrassing moment for Sweden whose govern-
ment had just been celebrating a deal with Indonesia worth 
$1.5 billion for the Swedish multinational, ABB, to build 
three power stations in Indonesia. Sweden's leading 
weapons producer, Bofors, has longstanding links with 
Indonesia, in particular for the•supply of guided missiles. 
Last September, the two countries signed an agreement on 
the protection and promotion of investment. Direct econ -
Continued on page 1 
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Suharto's clemency hoax 
A massive hoax has been mounted by the Indonesian regime which alleges that Xanana Gusmao, t~e 
resistance leader sentenced to life in May, has lodged a plea to President Suharto for clemency. U:lule 
this 'plea' could break all records in procedural swiftness, the appeals procedure for other convicted 
East Timorese political prisoners have been grossly mishandled by the courts. 
The forces of occupation in East Timor seem set on a 
strategy of obliterating the figure of Xanana Gusmao as the 
symbol of resistance to Indonesian rule. This is not to say 
they will physically exterminate him, but they will tum him 
into a non-person. They hope also to obliterate East 
Timor's resistance movement, the CNRM, hoping in this 
way to remove both him and it from living memory. 
One part of this strategy is to fabricate a story that 
Xanana Gusmao has lodged a plea for presidential clem-
ency, meaning that he acknowledges guilt. This is totally at 
variance with the position he adopted in his defence plea 
and is simply not credible. In his defence plea, Xanana 
declared: 
I reject the competence of any Indonesian court to try me, 
and in particular the jurisdiction of this court which has 
been implanted by force of arms and crimes committed 
against my homeland, East Timor. 
If, as is expected, President Suharto announces a deduc-
tion in Xanana's life sentence within the next few weeks, 
the regime expects to curry favour with many of its trading 
partners for its display of 'generosity and goodwill'. Inter-
national pressure against the unjust and illegal sentencing 
of Xanana Gusmao has steered clear of denouncing the trial 
as unlawful and concentrated instead on calling for 'leni-
ency' or clemency. To its discredit, this was the position 
officially taken by the European Community's Council of 
Ministers, despite Portugal's strong condemnation of the 
trial as not only unjust but also unlawful. 
Mystery surrounds Xanana 
Since he was bundled into an army truck, blindfolded, after 
being sentenced to life by an Indonesian court in Dili on 21 
May 1993, Xanana Gusmao, leader of the East Timorese 
resistance movement has been held incommunicado. Neither 
his parents nor his sisters have been allowed to visit him 
and nothing is known about his present whereabouts. 
When Xanana revealed that his alleged compliance with 
his captors was only a ruse to enable him to speak out in 
court, the army's strategy exploded in their faces. This will 
certainly have led the BAIS (intelligence) and Kopassus 
(elite troops) units in whose hands he has been held since 
his capture last November, to punish him with unimaginable 
severity. There have already been reports from clandestine 
sources that Xanana has been severely beaten since the 
verdict. A report from a reliable source that cannot be 
named says that Xanana is in a state of mental disorienta-
tion and 'unable to speak coherently'. This suggests that he 
has been given drugs capable of destroying his ability to act 
of his own free will. 
Military commander Major-General Theo Syafei has 
made it clear that Xanana will not be held in East Timor 
but has given no indication of where he will be held or 
whether he has already been removed from Dili. A mystery 
now surrounds his whereabouts and his state of physical 
and mental well-being. 
According to church sources in Dili, Xanana was moved 
to an unknown destination a few days before a visit to East 
Timor by the Vatican ambassador, Mgr Pietro Sambi, on 22 
July. This may have been to sabotage any attempt by the 
ambassador to meet Xanana during his visit. [Publico, 
24.VII.1993) 
Xanana declared in his lengthy defence plea which he was 
prevented from reading to the court after only two pages on 
17 May, that he would go on hunger strike. His unkempt 
appearance and demeanour in court on the final day of his 
trial (he was seen briefly on television) led to fears that he 
was already on hunger strike and seemed to be under 
considerable stress. 
'Clemency plea' 
On 4 June, the Indonesian lawyer Sudjono, Who was foisted 
on Xanana when he was in police custody in Jakarta (at the 
hearing on 5 May, Xanana announced that he no longer 
wanted Sudjono to defend him), announced that he had 
lodged a plea for presidential clemency on Xanana's behalf 
and with Xanana 's permission. There is nothing to show 
that Xanana knows anything about this. Indeed, according 
to the BBC World Service, none of the plea documents 
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lodged with the Dili district court by Sudjono bore Xanana's 
signature. The lawyer said he had done this because it was 
the quickest way to resolve the case, as appeals through the 
courts take months if not years to complete. 
Within days, Moerdiono, Suharto's State Secretary, said 
the clemency plea would be handled promptly; in mid-July, 
the chair of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Purwoto S. 
Gandasubrata said he would within days give the president 
his recommendation on the plea, which could clear the way 
for an announcement by Suharto during August. 
How are we to assess the behaviour of the judiciary? In 
court, the presiding-judge refused to allow Xanana to read 
more than the first couple of pages of his defence plea, an 
unprecedented denial of a defendant's right, unheard of in 
any political trial in living memory. Then, the judiciary 
snaps into top gear to make sure that Xanana can be 
granted clemency in record time. One guess is that Suharto 
will announce clemency on 17 August, a day for granting 
remission to prisoners. This could conveniently coincide 
with the talks being sponsored by Indonesia between East 
Timorese, another of their 'goodwill' gestures [see separate 
item]. 
No leniency for the others 
As for the East Timorese serving harsh sentences in Dili 
and Jakarta for participating in peaceful demonstrations, the 
judiciary is showing no leniency or haste in handling their 
appeals. Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha's life sentence for 
helping to organise and taking part in the peaceful demon-
stration in Dili on 12 November 1991 has been upheld by 
the Supreme Court. His lawyer, Luhut Pangaribuan, 
strongly criticised the procedure; he was never informed 
that the High Court, the first court of appeal, had issued its 
verdict on Gregorio's sentence and had only read about the 
Supreme Court's verdict in the press. 
The three East Timorese still serving sentences in Jakarta 
for taking part in a peaceful demonstration in the capital on 
19 November 1991 have also had their sentences upheld by 
the Supreme Court. Joao Freitas da Camara was given ten 
years, Fernando de Araujo got nine years and Virgilio da 
Silva Guterres got two years and six months. Here too the 
same lawyer has complained that the teams of lawyers 
acting for the three have been kept in the dark over high 
court and supreme court hearings and verdicts. Luhut told 
the press he heard nothing about the Supreme Court's 
decision until he visited the three in prison in June. 
Having exhausted procedures to appeal against sentence, 
the three East Timorese in Jakarta have refused to ask for 
clemency, insisting that they are guilty of nothing. Luhut 
said they told him: ~It is those who put us in jail who are 
guilty and who should make an apalogy." 
Luhut had not yet met Gregorio m Dili to ask him how to 
proceed now that his life sentence has been upheld by the 
Supreme Court. It is more than likely that he will adopt the 
same position as the Jakarta three. * 
Continued from pa.ge 5 
omic aid to Indonesia has been small because of the 
controversy surrounding financing a regime that is disqual-
ified under Swedish law from getting aid because of its 
human rights record. The government gets round this by 
channelling aid through the Nordic Investment Bank owned 
by Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Iceland, which 
has provided $150 million in aid to Indonesia since 1978. 
Finland's business interests in Indonesia are related mainly 
to timber and the paper and pulp industry. This includes 
funding through FINNIDA, the government's overseas aid 
agency of the supply of seedlings for timber estate projects 
and consultancy agreements for paper and pulp projects. A 
joint investment project in Cirebon, Central Java, will 
provide a market for Finnish equipment to a newsprint mill. 
[Pulping the Rainforest, Special Report No. 1 of Down to 
Earth, July 1991] * 
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Jakarta's latest 'confidence-building measure' 
On 20 July, the Indonesian government announced that it had given the go-ahead for talks to take 
place between pro-integration and anti-integration East Timorese. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas ~ave 
the green light after meeting President Suharto, a standard procedure by cabinet ministers to signal 
that the move has Suharto~ approval. 
Following the announcement, Francisco Xavier Lopes da 
Cruz, Suharto's 'roving ambassador' for East Timor affairs 
and the regime's top-ranking Timorese collaborator, stepped 
forward to handle the matter on Suharto's behalf. 
Some commentators were taken by surprise, seeing this as 
a concession to world opinion made by Suharto under 
pressure. It is however a slick diplomatic manoeuvre 
designed to fend off persistent calls for the East Timorese, 
in particular the East Timorese resistance, to be involved in 
the UN-sponsored · talks between Indonesia and Portugal. 
After insisting that Indonesian sovereignty over East 
Timor "will not be an issue", Lopes da Cruz set the stage 
for the talks by saying he recently met Fretilin's Abilio 
Araujo in Brussels and claimed that the initiative for the 
talks had come from the latter. Abilio Araujo heads Freti-
lin's ·external delegation, the DEF. Others see the origins of 
the idea as having come from Indonesian army intelligence 
which played such a crucial role in the early period of 
Indonesia's war to grab East Timor. 
Origins of the 'talks' idea 
The first mention of talks between pro-integration and 
anti-integration East Timorese came in April this year, just 
before the UN-sponsored Rome talks between Indonesia 
and Portugal on 21 April. The idea was mooted in inter-
views made by Indonesian journalist Petrus Suryadi, during 
a visit to Lisbon. Suryadi who writes for the Jakarta daily, 
Suara Pembaruan is known to have close links to army 
intelligence, BAIS, through the Indonesian military attaches 
in Brussels and The Hague. His trip to Lisbon is known to 
have taken place at their instigation. 
Many East Timorese political exiles in Lisbon were wary 
of Suryadi's background. The only ones to respond to his 
approaches were Abilio Araujo and Jose Martins, leader of 
the minuscule Kota party who in 1975 threw in his lot with 
Indonesia, defected a year later, but more recently again 
took a pronounced pro-Jakarta stance. Few people doubt 
that Martins has all along been a tool of military intelli-
gence. It therefore came as no surprise to read about his 
enthusiasm over moves from Jakarta for ·talks between East 
Timorese. 
The shift in position by Abilio Araujo came as more of a 
surprise and it is far from clear that he represents Fretilin or 
that his enthusiastic response to such talks represents the 
views of a party that has been the staunchest opponent to 
the Indonesian invasion and Jed the armed resistance in the 
interior from 1975 on. Indeed, the deputy head of DEF, 
Mari Alkatiri, told LUSA [Diario de Noticias, 23.VIl.1993) 
that the majority of Fretilin leaders categorically reject the 
position taken by Araujo who, be said, is acting in his per-
sonal capacity. 
In an interview with Suara Pembaruan on 8 April, Araujo 
came out with a number of remarks that are uncharacteristic 
for a Fretilin leader. He criticised the young people who 
participated in the Santa Cruz demonstration in Dili on 12 
November 1991 for unfurling banners which, he claimed, 
had "acted as a provocation". He went on to accuse the 
Catholic church in East Timor of going beyond the bounds 
of its 'non-political' role and then declared that all sides in 
the East Timor conflict, Indonesia, Portugal and Fretilin 
should acknowledge that they had made mistakes in the 
past. 
It was in a later interview with Radio Netherlands that he 
made the suggestion that pro- and anti-integration Tim-
orese should· talk to each other. He acknowledged that 
Petrus Suryadi had "offered his services" to make this 
possible. It is difficult to believe that Araujo does not know 
he is accepting the services of the very intelligence network 
which has played such a sinister and de-stabilising role in 
East Timor throughout the history of Indonesia's war 
against East Timor, bringing so much suffering to the 
people of East Timor. 
In an interview last month with the Lisbon daily, Diario 
de Noticias [30.VI.1993), Araujo acknowledged that the 
talks could only happen if Jakarta gave the green light and 
thought they would take place before the next round of 
talks between Indonesia and Portugal in New York on 17 
September this year. He also revealed that he now believes 
that the armed resistance in East Timor is "worn out" and 
that all that now remains for the East Timorese is to "wage 
cul'tural resistance". 
Besides Petrus Suryadi, the other figure to emerge as a 
key link in this murky affair is the Portuguese journalist-
tumed-businessman, Nuno Rocha, a close friend of former 
Indonesian foreign minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja who 
produced a glowing report of a visit to East Timor in the 
late 1980s and later published a book entitled, East Timor, 
the 27th Province. 
Rocha visited Jakarta in April this ,year to sound out the 
Indonesian government on Araujo's willingness to hold 
talks. His announcement that Jakarta would insist on 
Jakarta, not Bangkok, as the venue and would refuse to 
allow any discussion on Indonesian sovereignty over East 
Timor led Araujo to abort the. talks at that stage. 
As yet, Araujo is the only anti-integration East Timorese 
in exile to want to take part in these talks. The initiative has 
been roundly condemned by CNRM overseas representative, 
Jose Ramos-Horta. In April this year, at the time of the 
Rome talks, Horta for the CNRM, Mari Alkatiri for Fretilin 
an.d Joao Carrascalao for the UDT, in a joint statement, 
re1ected Jakarta's talks initiative. Alatas was in no position, 
they said, to offer any concessions on human rights, let 
alone address the roots of the problem. The deputy chief of 
the UDT in Portugal has also rejected the idea, saying that 
the Timorese should only accept a format which involves 
Portugal as the administering power. 
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Discrediting the resistance 
So, what are Jakarta's motives in promoting the talks? It 
hopes to win international favour by appearing to allow 
opposing East Timorese to come together in an attempt at 
reconciliation. Jakarta would like to dress this up as a 
'confidence-building measure' to end the staJemate in the 
UN-sponsored talks. 
But the international community should realise that 
Jakarta's format is designed to exclude the East Timorese 
resistance. It is Jakarta's intention in particular to exclude 
the embodiment of that resistance, the National Council of 
Maubere Resistance, whose leader, Xanana Gusmao, was 
sentenced to life by an Indonesian court in May this year, 
and now languishes, incommunicado, in some God-for-
saken prison goodness knows where. The rightful partici-
pant in any talks is Xanana Gusmao himself, or those who 
are his legitimate representatives. 
The arrest and trial of Xanana Gusmao set in trail a 
strategy to obliterate both him personally and the entire 
resistance movement, hoping to remove them as the rightful 
participants in any negotiations to lead to an act of self-
determination in East Timor. Before his arrest, Xanana 
Gusmao repeatedly called for talks leading to a peaceful 
solution to the conflict and declared his willingness to take 
part in talks. He returned to this theme in the defence plea 
that he was prevented from reading out in court, when he 
called on the international community "to press Jakarta to 
accept dialogue with the Portuguese and the Timorese in 
the search for an internationally-acceptable solution". 
The voice of Xanana Gusmao has now been silenced but 
resistance inside East Timor is in no way diminished by his 
absence. Its right to a place in the talks cannot be snuffed 
out by a diplomatic ploy from the regime that has illegally 
occupied East Timor for nearly eighteen years and brought 
untold suffering to its people. • 
Fifth conference on East Timor in Portugal 
For the fifth year running, the University of Oporto organised a conference on East Timor. This year, 
the fociis was on developments in Indonesia. The Timorese leader Jose Ramos-Horta who was among 
the speakers, announced the new structure of the resistance. 
Prof. Antonio Barbedo Magelhaes has been convener of all 
five conferences. A dedicated activist, he has become 
known affectionately as Mr. East Timor. This time he 
invited several top Indonesianists, Ben Anderson, Daniel 
Lev, Akihisa Matsuno and Ingrid Wessel while noted East 
Timor specialists like Roger Clark, John Taylor, Michel 
Robert, Masao Y amagushi, Artur Teodoro de Matos. 
Adriano Moreira MP and Pedro Pinto Leite were also 
present. TAPOL was represented by Liem Soei Liong who 
gave a. talk on Indonesia's Orde Baru. Besides Portuguese 
politicians, Lord Avebury (UK) and Gary Gibson {Austra-
lian MP) were among the speakers; human rights activists 
came from fjve continents: Asia, America, Africa, .Australia 
and Europe also participated in the conference. 
These conferences are particularly interesting because of 
the active participation of the East Timorese community. 
Because of the special focus on Indonesia, a large delega-
tion came from Indonesia, including Indonesian exiles, 
Indonesian activists living abroad and a number of 
Indonesians who made a specjal (and risky) effort to travel 
from Indonesia to Portugal. As there are no diplomatic 
relations between the two countries, there are complications 
for Indonesians travelling to Portugal. Indonesian partici-
pation was very active; for the first time the East Timorese 
refugee community was able to share thoughts with 
Indonesian dissidents. The Oporto conference (this time 
held in Estoril, just outside Lisbon) has become a unique 
meeting place for East Timorese, Indonesians, Portuguese 
and the international community. - Here is international 
solidarity with East Timor in action. 
The new structure of the resistance 
Jose Ramos-Horta told the conference of the new structure 
of CNRM (National Council of Maubere Resistance), the 
umbrella organisation of the resistance. He denied that there 
was a vacuum in the leadership after the arrest of Xanana 
Gusmao and Mau Huno. Konis Santana immediately took 
over and after a period of consolidation, a new structure 
was created. 
The resistance is now represented by a troika: Konis 
Santana for the Executive Council of the armed resistance 
(CEL), Jose Ramos-Horta as CNRM special representative 
abroad and a third person representing the Executive 
Council of the dandestine front (CEFC) not identified by 
name. ,The CEL and CEFC each have five members. The 
CEL is divided into commissions~ one of which is . a 
Political and Military Commission (PMC) which includes 
political party structures like the Fretilin Directive Commit-
tee and the chief-of-staff of Falintil, the armed wing of the 
resistance. 
Abroad, CNRM is rapidly building its own structure with 
representatives in different countries. CNRM representatives 
include: Jose Antonio Amorim Dias at the European 
Community, Luis Cardoso in Portugal, Alexandrina Corte 
Real in the South Pacific, Lay Konen in Melbourne, Filom-
eno Andrade in Sidney and Abe Barreto in Canada. Other 
appointments will follow. An Information and Documenta-
tion Centre bas been set up with experienced activists like 
Agio Pereira, Ines Almeida, Lola Reis and Geraldo Magno. 
The ' new structure differs in many respects from the 
structure under Xanana. Recognising the importance of 
political work in the towns and among Indonesians, the 
Clandestine Front is now more prominent. Second, politics 
have taken a commanding position as the Falintil chief-of-
staff is now under the Political and Military Commission. 
As he is in captivity, Xanana Gusmao occupies no formal 
position in the new structure but is acknowledged as the 
nominal leader and a source of inspiration for the resis-
tance. He is definitely not written off by the new CNRM 
leadership. * 
For more information and papers from the Fifth Oporto 
C9nference, contact Prof. A. Barbedo de Magelhaes, 
Engineering Faculty, Oporto University, Rua dos 
Bragas, 4099 Porto Codex, Portugal. 
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"I met no-one who supports the occupation" 
A US journalist who visited East Timor in mid-June was deeply impressed by the strength of fe.eling 
in the country against the Indonesian forces of occupation. He expressed amazement at the continued 
strength of the resistance despite the heavy hand of repression. The nature of the repression had 
become a recruiting ground for the armed resistance in the interior. 
In an interview with TAPOL, Reese Erlich, a freelance 
journalist from Oakland, California, said he spent three days 
in East Timor without the authorities paying any apparent 
attention to his presence. This enabled him to move round 
freely, talk to people - using Spanish - and visit several 
villages and towns. At the end of the third day, he was 
approached by an official, accused of carrying out 'unau-
thorised journalistic activities' and told to leave for Jakarta 
the next morning. 
Erlich said he chatted to many people - in the streets, in 
the markets and on buses - but did not meet a single 
Timorese who supported the Indonesian occupation. The 
moment the conversation turned to anything serious, people 
were unanimous in their opposition to integration. 
He was particularly struck by his interview of Father 
Dominggus Soares in Ermera who agreed to talk on the 
record. Other priests were not willing to be quoted but all 
expressed opposition to the Indonesians and were in general 
sympathy with the resistance. 
Resistance confident of victory 
Erlich was able to meet a number of middle and upper-
level activists attached to the resistance in the central region 
and inte:viewed Ramon, a middle-level resistance council 
leader. "We want Christian socialism because all the 
Timorese are Catholics," said Ramon, adding that the 
independent East Timor envisioned by the resistance would 
adopt the principles of European-style social democracy. 
Ramon told Erlich that the movement has about a thou-
sand people in the hills, 350 of whom bear arms. The 
resistance has twenty-four groups active in Dili, mostly 
among students and workers. It no longer hopes for a 
military victory. "In the military struggle alone, Indonesia 
will win. But in the political struggle, the victory is ours." 
They pin their hopes on international pressure to force 
concessions from Jakarta. Commenting on US support for 
the UN Human Rights Commission resolution condemning 
Indonesia, Ramon hoped Clinton would back up its vote 
with action. "We don't need support in words but in deeds." 
[San Francisco Chronicle, 13.VIl.1993] 
Erlich told TAPOL that although the military presence 
was not over-conspicuous in Dili, as soon as one goes 
along the country roads and villages, soldiers are to be seen 
everywhere. He had come away from East Timor with the 
sense of a pervasive fear of spies and police everywhere. It 
was hard to find anywhere safe from the prying eyes of the 
security. 
' 
"We all fear for our safety" 
These excerpts are from Reese Erlich's interview of Father 
Domingus Soares of the parish of Ermera: 
Q: What is the state of the coffee trade? 
Ermera is the richest district in East Timor mainly 
because of coffee. Before it was economically well off but 
now the region is disadvantaged because of the Jow price of 
coffee. Our coffee is exported by DENOK which I hear 
belongs to generals with stars. People are very upset. We 
have talked to those responsible about introducing a free 
market but this is very difficult to achieve because we are 
living under the monopolistic generals and in Indonesia, it's 
very difficult to oppose those who are higher up. 
Q: What is the impact of the arrest of Xanana Gusmao 
and his second-in-command on morale? 
Above all Xanana Gusmao is a leader of the Timorese 
people. He has always been seen as their leader. His 17 
years of work in the jungle put him in a very favourable 
position with the Timorese who are hoping for their 
freedom. The people see them as heroes who have fuJfiJJed 
their duties and are now at the mercy of the enemy. The 
resistance has not died down and has a new leader, Konis 
Santana. 
Q: Do you fear for your own safety, given the out-
spokenness of your views? 
Here in Timor we all fear for our safety and security. We 
see that when a Timorese has the opportunity to leave, they 
do so either through the International Red Cross, or as 
business people with a Jot of money. I myself am not afraid 
of death - today or tomorrow, it's all the same. The 
important thing is to defend justice for our people who have 
suffered enough. Dying today or tomorrow is of no conse-
quence to a priest; that's the least of my concerns. 
Q: What is the situation with the extent of the military 
presence? 
Here in Timor, their presence has always been a big 
problem. It was ·supposed to be the way in which they 
could control the Timorese as we have seen in the Novem-
ber 12 saga. They retreated when the world cried 'foul' so 
they tried other means. 
At the moment they are using a network of territorial 
command all over East Timor. In the villages they build 
houses, work on the rice-fields and visit vegetable gardens. 
They aim at conquering the people through their hearts but 
they are just seen as an army presence who are armed even 
when they go to the fields. Their caring strategy does not 
melt our hearts because we are people of strong will who 
won't be bought. What we want is our freedom. .. 
[Interview on ABC Radio, Indian Pacific, 5.VII.1993. Also 
broadcast on BBC Dateline East Asia.] 
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EASTTIMOR 
ICRC forced to stop prison visits 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) issued a statement in June deploring the 
difficulties it has had in the conduct of prison visits in East Timor. This outspoken condemnation of the 
behaviour of a host government means that independent observation of the condition of prisoners in 
East Timor has reached a new low. 
The ICRC has maintained an office in East Timor since 
1979, one of its tasks being to conduct visits to political 
prisoners on a regular basis. It is we11 known that the 
humanitarian agency has access to only a limited number of 
detention places. Detention centres run by local military 
commands are excluded, as are many places where people 
are taken in for intense interrogation, almost invariably to 
the accompaniment of torture. 
The ICRC's presence in East Timor is based on the 1949 
Fourth Geneva Convention regarding the protection of 
populations in occupied territories. The Geneva Conven-
tions relate to the humanitarian laws of war and the ICRC 
has responsibility for safeguarding adherence to these laws. 
The agency had an office in East Timor in 1975 but was 
forced to leave in the wake of the Indonesian invasion in 
December 1975. It was not allowed to return until March 
1979, following an international outcry over reports of huge 
loss of life during the Indonesian army's large-scale oper-
ations to gain control of the territory. 
Visiting political prisoners became one of the main 
activities of the ICRC in East Timor. In 1992, ICRC 
delegates visited 110 East Timorese prisoners in 20 places 
of detention in Dili and Jakarta, but since the beginning of 
this year, the military authorities have made it impossible 
for the agency to continue with this programme. 
Theo Syafei wants to end ICRC presence 
Major-General Theo Syafei who was recently promoted 
from being commander of the now-disbanded special 
operations command, Kolakops to becoming commander of 
the Udayana/IXth regional military command based in Bali, 
is still personally directing army operations in East Timor. 
He has repeatedly displayed contempt for all international 
agencies, from the UN down, which are seeking to monitor 
the situation in East Timor. 
In May this year he announced that it was no longer 
necessary for the ICRC to maintain an office in East Timor. 
The announcement came as ICRC President, Cornelio 
Sommaruga was in Jakarta to complain about difficulties 
the agency was having in the conduct of prison visits in 
East Timor. But Syafei's call for it to quit did not seem to 
have the approval of President Suharto who told the ICRC 
President that the office in East Timor would remain open. 
After a brief trip to East Timor, he expressed satisfaction 
that things would improve, but this was not to be. 
A programme of visfts which began on 25 May was 
abandoned amid angry denunciations by Pierre Pont, the 
ICRC chief delegate in Indonesia, who told the press in 
Jakarta that the agency bad been forced to take a "very 
complex, serious and heavy decision (because) 1he necess-
ary conditions for Red Cross have not been met". 
Soon after, international pressure intensified for indepen-
dent observers to meet Xanana Gusmao who had been 
given a life sentence on 21 May and was believed to be on 
hunger strike. The only agency likely to carry out this 
mission with not too much difficulty was the Red Cross so 
it appears that Ali Alatas, under pressure regarding Xana-
na's state of health, prevailed upon the military to provide 
the necessary conditions for Red Cross visits to resume. 
The ICRC announced a new programme of visits starting on 
17 June while Major-General Theo Syafei made it clear 
that he would not make things easy for them. "They will be 
here for two days but they had better not try to disrupt or 
influence interrogations, or I'Il send them home," he said. 
[Republika, 17.VI.1993) 
Although the ICRC refrained from saying who they met 
when the programme of visits began, Syafei says that they 
did meet Xanana. A few other prisoners were visited but 
when the team complained about many prisoners being 
moved before they could be visited, the team was told it 
would have to go to Bali for discussions with the military 
commander before the scheduled visits could continue. This 
made its work impossible, forcing the team once again to 
abandon the programme of visits. This time, the agency 
delivered a sharp public rebuke of the government [see 
box). 
Since then, the position has not changed and prisoners in 
East Timor have been deprived of the minimal protectjon 
that the ICRC has been able to provide. it-
TAPOL Bulletin No. 118, August 1993 11 
Aid for Suharto still going up 
The Consultative Group on Indonesia this year announced an aid programme of $5.1 billion to the 
Suharto regime, an increase of US$ 200 million. Earlier signals suggested that foreign aid to Jakarta 
might decrease but four countries, Japan, Spain, Austria and the UK saved the day for Jakarta. 
There were signs that the idea of linking human rights to 
development aid was gaining ground. Six CGI member 
states reduced their bilateral aid, including the US, Austra-
lia, France and Belgium, though human rights may not have 
been the reason as aid amounts from some countries tend to 
fluctuate from year to year. Belgium reduced it aid to zero 
after Suharto rdused to accept any mention of human rights 
in a new aid accord still under discussion. In 1992, Suharto 
ended the aid programme from HoJland because it had 
Jinked aid with human rights. Canada is more complicated. 
Last year Canada froze its aid to Indonesia but this year it 
aJlocated US$ 30.S million, most of it for the Canada-
Indonesia university aid program. 
While human rights considerations are playing a role, 
realpolitik arguments still predominate. Before the CGI 
conference, the Economic Affairs Coordinating Minister 
who heads the Indonesian team to the CGI, Dr. Saleh Affif, 
warned that the EC may be reluctant to channel more aid to 
Jakarta and the third world because of security problems 
relating to conflicts in eastern Europe which could spread 
across Europe. 
Profit above principles 
In most cases development aid remains an extension of 
foreign policy or helps to reinforce economic interests. 
Japanese aid, at US$ 1,440 million (up US$ 220 million on 
last year), accounts for a third of CGI aid and a sign of 
how extensive Japanese-Indonesian economic relations are. 
Japan needs to strengthen ties with Asian-Pacific countries 
against growing criticism from the west about Japan's huge 
trade surplus. Several years ago, Japan announced four 
human rights criteria that should be linked to aid, but they 
have never been applied to Jakarta. 
As for the UK, its aid this year nearly tripled from US$ 
35 million to USS 98.6 million in concessionary aid, while 
British economic interests in Indonesia are expanding fast. 
They include the recent deal for 24 Hawks fighter planes, 
the PT PENI polyethylene plant (half owned by BP Chemi-
cals and 24 per cent by Sigit Suharto) and PT Kaltimprima, 
owned by BP Coal, Indonesia's largest coal mine. 
The Indonesian economy: boom or recession? 
Indonesia is often proclaimed by the World Bank as a third 
world country that has coped successfuJly with poverty, 
development and economic growth. But one should not 
ignore the natural resources it possesses as compared to the 
Philippines or Thailand. In many ways Suharto has been 
very lucky. Indonesia is still Asia's largest oil exporter, it is 
the largest natural gas exporter in the world and it has 
become the fourth largest coal exporter after Australia, 
South Africa and the US. 
With large foreign exchange earnings, it has been able to 
pour large sums into a wide variety of projects: giant steel 
mills, satellite networks, the aerospace industry, infra-
structural works, schools etc. 
The Asian Pacific region has enjoyed a boom and Indo-
nesia has received its share of investments in manufac-
turing. Indonesia is now an Asian cub, foUowing tigers like 
Hongkong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea. Manufac-
turing output will soon overtake oil and agricultural output. 
In the last five years, $34 billion in direct foreign invest-
ment has entered Indonesia and annual economic growth 
has remained steady at around 7 per cent. 
The darker side 
But this success story has its darker side. Indonesia is Asia's 
largest debtor. The external public and private debt is 
estimated as $85 billion of which around $50 billion is 
public. Debt servicing this year will absorb $7.2 billion, far 
in excess of the $5 billion from the CGI. Non-oil exports 
have risen to $23 billion while non-oil imports have risen 
even more, to $27 billion. Foreign investment is in decline, 
with investors turning to countries like China, Vietnam and 
India which offer more attractive tax holidays, higher 
productivity and better infrastructure. 
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Casino economy and bad debts 
The Indonesian banking system is in crisis. The casino 
boom of the late eighties has led to cash flow problems in 
the banking sector. Bad debts are threatening to engulf 
Indonesian banks. The collapse of Banlc Summa, one of the 
largest private banks, is a sign of how serious things have 
become. The unbridled growth of private banks in the last 
ten years has now come to a halt and a major overhaul of 
the banking system (including many mergers) will be 
needed to restore confidence. The easy lend-and-spend 
days arc over. 
The central bank estimates that state and private banks 
have bad debts totalling some 3.5 trillion rupiahs (US$ 1.66 
billion) but many analysts believe the figure is between 10 
and 20 trillion rupiahs. The state banks have been worst hit 
not least because of unlimited borrowing by Suharto's 
offspring and palace cronies. In June a list of Indonesia's 
worst corporate debtors was leaked. Economic analysts say 
the leak was made with backing at the highest level of 
government. The list includes non-performing loans -
where no interest has been paid for over three months - of 
six state banks. Bankers in Jakarta say the non-performing 
Joans of state banks amount to 15-30% of their portfolios. 
Racist language 
Consternation grew when a decision was announced placing 
a six-month travel ban on more than 300 businessmen 
accused of owing state banks more than 250 million 
rupiahs. Were this decree to be applied properly, none of 
Suharto's enterprising offspring would be able to travel 
abroad. 
To allay public fears, Suharto assured the ailing cooper-
ative movement that conglomerates would not be allowed 
to dominate the economy. Anti-Chinese sentiment is in the 
-
--
air as many conglomerates are run by Indonesian Chinese. 
The president said the economy would be jointly controlled 
by the government and the cooperatives so as to ensure 
equitable distribution of wealth. Conglomerates should "sell 
part of their shares to the cooperatives voluntarily. If they 
are not willing, we will make them willing". He said further: 
"! even said, they (the Indonesian Chinese) started with 
underpants and I said this to Liem Bian Khoen ... " (a 
succesful businessman). 
Fourth largest country in the world 
Unlike other Asian-Pacific countries with small popula-
tions, Indonesia has to cope with 2.3 million new entrants 
to the Jabour market a year. Indonesian workers arc the 
lowest paid in the region; average wage costs are 30 dollar 
cents (about a third of neighbouring Thailand and Malaysia) 
and well below the meagre wages paid in China. 
The World Bank is not all smiles however. Its 1993 report 
on Indonesia criticises the government over the poor results 
of its deregulation. The Bank has been pressing Indonesia 
for several years to liberalise (or deregulate) the economy. 
Unless this happens, it argues, it runs the risks of falling 
behind its fast growing neighbours. 
Free trade and monopolies 
The Indonesian economy has moved in two different direc-
tions. While manufacturing industry has entered the com-
petitive global market, other sectors arc heavily protected. 
The economic reforms of the mid eighties, in theory to 
develop a laissez-faire economy, have been very profitable 
for the well-connected conglomerates. Meanwhile new 
monopolies have emerged, primarily run by the six Suharto 
offspring. The buntconinJt business interests of the Suharto 
family have become a major issue in Indonesia today. 'They 
range from billion-dollar petrochemical plants, toll high-
ways, airline ventures to the monopoly of citrus fruit in 
Kalimantan. 
Another heavy financial burden for the state is the high-
tcchnology dreams of Suharto's favourite minister, Habibic. 
Habibic stresses the need to develop high-tech industry 
alongside traditional export-oriented manufacturing goods 
like textile and shoes. His strategic industries, aircraft, ships 
and weapons, part of the Indonesian military industrial 
complex, arc very costly. State subsidies of between $1.5 
and $2 billion are gobbled up annually by Habibie and his 
high-tech plans. 
Jubilant stories about Indonesia's economic success are 
being toned down. Analysts now use more restrained 
language: "The economy is off track" or "it has to find its 
proper course", or "sound but slow", or as the World Bank 
puts it: "If the momentum of development can be main-
tained ... " Much of Indonesia's economic boom of the 
eighties is an empty shell. It is the same casino economy as 
elsewhere, with the difference that Indonesia has to cope 
with a population that is fast approaching 200 million souls. 
World Bank should respect human rights 
TAPOL called on the World Bank, which presides over the 
001, to consider human rights when decided if Indonesia 
snould get . $5 billion aid this year. Conditionality of aid 
shoul<lbe.an integral part of Banlc and CGI policy, it said 
in a letter to the Bank's president, Lewis Preston. 
Asia Watch also wrote to the Director of USAID asking 
that many rights issues should be raised at the CGI meeting. 
~ 
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The army takes on the students 
In the last few months there has been a marked increase in student protests across the country. Most 
t?ctions relate to campus affairs, protests against high tuition fees, dissatisfaction with the quality of 
teaching, lack of academic freedom and so on. Yet the military have resorted to an extraordinary level 
of violence against these low-level actions. 
The impression is growing that somewhere in Cilangkap, 
the military HQ in Jakarta, a decision has been taken to hit 
hard at student protest. At the recent ABRI (Armed Forces] 
leadership meeting, the new commander-in-chief, General 
Faisal Tandjung, warned the top brass that democratisation, 
openness, human rights and environment were the main 
issues. These issues are gradually becoming the focus on 
the campuses. 
Colonel Wahyu Hamidjaya from the Yogyakarta military 
command has complained that students often create 
organisations for a single cause, then emerge with another 
cause-oriented organisation under a different name. Military 
intelligence call this organisasi tanpa bentuk (organisation 
without shape), usually regarded as the style adopted by 
communists working underground. The military know that 
the many committees and action groups are composed of 
students who can mobilise a great many people as well as 
students. The Yogya military command has announeed a list 
of 20 names of students who are regarded as key persons in 
many demonstrations. 
Protests on campus, in the streets and at the parliament 
building have become commonplace. 
Here are a few examples: 
Arena, a case of press freedom 
At the State Muslim Institute (IAIN) Sunan Kalijaga in 
Yogyakarta a fierce conflict broke out between the students 
and the Dean Dr. Simuh after he banned the campus 
magazine, ARENA the latest issue of which carried articles 
about the wealth of the sons and daughters of high-placed 
people. ARENA also published interviews of outSpoken 
dissidents like Adnan Buyung Nasution and Arief Budiman. 
After a student proposal for talks with the IAIN authorities 
was rejected, direct actions followed. An open forum was 
organised as well as a boycott of semester exams followed 
by occupation of the Dean's office. 
A police contingent arrived and students who resisted 
were attacked, beaten, kicked and dragged off. Thirteen 
students were detained and released after interrogation. 
Other students were held at the Dean's office and interro-
gated on the spot. The authorities proposed a solution to the 
conflict, allowing ARENA to continue but as a general 
publication. Whereas previously ARENA was a publication 
with a restricted circulation, it will now need two permits 
from the Ministry of Information. This could be the kiss of 
death. 
'Kidnap' of college teachers 
The conflict at ISTN (National Institute for Science and 
Technology) has also created a stir. It started with a row 
between students and teachers in the Electronics Depart-
ment. The students wanted to do field work in a rural area 
but the authorities said there were no funds. Since tuition 
fees are very high, the students sought clarification. Mean-
while other complaints were piling up: bad teaching and 
lab. facilities, unreliable lecturers, dictatorial conditions, etc. 
The students decided to occupy the dean's office and 
demanded negotiations with the authorities. The college 
sent four ~ople to negotiate but while the negotiations 
were under way, a huge police force forced its way onto the 
premises, throwing tear gas and using excessive force 
against the students. There were many broken ribs, bruises 
and injuries among the students. Fifty students were 
arrested and released after severe interrogation. 
It now appears that five students have been selected to go 
on trial, charged with kidnapping. Police brutality only 
aggravated the conflict. The ISTN students have twice gone 
to parliament to demand the release of their coJleagues and 
to protest against police intervention. Answering charges 
that the ISTN officials were being held hostage, the 
students insist that the four were negotiating with them, 
another relatively minor issue which has been blown up 
because of police violence. 
Trials in Central Java 
An incident more than a year ago in Semarang, Central 
Java, has now come to court. Lukas Luwarso (25) and 
Poltak Ike Wibowo (25) have been charged under article 
154 of the Criminal Code which is commonly known as the 
haatzaai (incitement to hatred) article. This law can result 
in up to seven years in prison for anyone found guilty of 
inciting hatred of state authorities. The two students have 
been indicted for involvement in an event on 20 May 1992, 
National Awakening Day, during pre-election days when 
meetings . and public gatherings were easier to hold. 
The students at Diponegoro University in Semarang 
organised a Public Forum attended by many thousands of 
students. It was a lively ev~nt which was compared to 
Speaker's Comer in London. A group called Forum Ma-
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hasiswa Semarang (Semarang Student Forum) expressed 
dissatisfaction with the general elections. According to the 
indictment, their statement described the elections as a 
money-wasting, politically-engineered event. It also 
criticised the fact that many seats in parliament and the 
upper house _go to presidential ap_pointees. 
The 20 May event became known as a golput (golongan 
putih, white or 'blank voting slip' group) event. Golput has 
emerged at every general election, calling on people to go 
the polls and hand in blank voting-slips. The golput vote 
in Central Java was particularly high, especially among the 
youth. The two students are accused of asking people to 
exercise a golput vote. During the trial the two students 
held firm. Lukas Luwarso told the court: "We criticised 
without anger. And social control is an expression of our 
civic duty. What's wrong with that? Poltak said: "/agree 
with golput because golput does not violate existing laws or 
democracy". 
The two students are being defended by the Semarang 
LBH chapter; the well-known human rights lawyer Buyung 
Nasution has agreed to join the defence team. 
Solidarity before and after the opening hearing was 
enormous. During one support rally at the Teachers' College 
in Semarang two students, Kunadi and Taufan Arif, were 
arrested by the military authoritjes. More student groups 
have emerged in support of the two defendants: the Sema-
rang Students Solidarity, Students Solidarity of Indonesia 
and the Anti-Fascist Youth and Student Front. In Jakarta 
several hundreds of students carrying posters and banners 
went to Parliament to protest against the trial. The group 
calls itself Forum Komunikasi Mahasiswa Merdeka (Free 
Student Communication Forum) and carried banners saying: 
"Down with the haatzaai laws" and "Golput is the hallmark 
of democracy". The students were also campaigning against 
another trial, the so called TUR (land-for-the-people) case 
(see also Tapol Bulletin 117), in which two people have 
been charged for distributing the banned TUR calendar in 
1991. 
Commentators in Jakarta say that these two old cases have 
been revived as a warning to the students. 
Pre-emptive security 
The new Minister of Education Dr. Wardiman Djoyonegoro 
was due to visit Gajah Mada University in Yogya on 3 
July. Demonstrations against him were expected and 
security officers were on alert well in advance. The night 
before the visit, the police raided a student gat,hering and 
arrested 8 persons. The gathering was attended by students 
from Jakarta, Semarang, Solo and elsewhere. The students 
were taken to Police HQ for questioning, another example 
of harsh measures against students. 
The actions and demands of the students are fair and just. 
While it is premature to speak about a resurgence of the 
student movement, it is undoubtedly true that campus acti-
vities are on the increase. Student activists deserve and need 
solidarity from outside. They should not be left to struggle 
alone for democracy and human rights. • 
Continued from page 24 
Even as this review was being written, a report came in of 
troops raiding a meeting of Aceh Merdeka guerrillas in a 
small village in Matangkuli district, killing two and injuring 
eight others. This is based on official army sources and is 
bound to be only a partial account of what really happened. 
Amnesty condemns the fact that no military or police 
officials have been brought to justice for human rights 
related offenses in Aceh. Ironically, this complaint appears 
immediately after the quotation of Pramono telling people 
to go out and kill. Having made it clear that the atrocities 
are officially authorised at the highest level, what chance is 
there for anyone to be brought to justice? Here is a case, as 
with so many of the crimes perpetrated in Indonesia since 
1Q65, for a war-crimes tribunal or a tribunal for crimes 
against humanity. The regime itself cannot be expected to 
bring its own well-trained practitioners to justice. 
Amnesty rightly takes the international community to task 
for . the fact that the grave violations in Aceh have gone 
virtually unnoticed by member States of the UN. This 
August, the UN will have a chance to rectify this when the 
UN Human Rights Sub-Commission meets. Let this be the 
occasion for the experts who sit on that body to adopt a 
resolution censoring Indonesia and calling for international 
investigations in Aceh like those that have already been 
demanded for East Timor. * 
Carmel Budiardjo 
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UK-Indonesia ties surge ahead 
Jn June 1993, Britain's relations with Indonesia reached an unprecedented level. Britain became that 
country's largest arms supplier, with the final contract for 24 Hawks signed with British Aerospace. 
It also agreed to an unparalleled increase in its annual aid commitment , to Indonesia. 
While the issue of human rights was being trampled on at 
the UN Human Rights Conference in Vienna, it was being 
downgraded more concretely by developments in Britain's 
relations with Indonesia. On June 10, British Aerospace 
finally announced its contract with Indonesia for 24 Hawk 
trainer/ground attack aircraft, worth £500 million including 
spare parts and technical training. Defence Secretary 
Malcolm Rifkind, after visiting Jakarta in May to seal the 
deal, said it was 'splendid news for British Aerospace'. 
Hurd beaming at Suharto, Jak. Post 06-W-93 
Many British press reports focused on the controversy 
sparked by the deal. "Hawk deal promotes huma.n rights 
row - Britain accused of 'cheering on' Indonesian military 
as Rifki,nd hails £500m order" ran the Guardian headline. 
The Independent pointed out that in 1989 as foreign 
secretary, John Major prevented the sale of Hawks to Iraq 
for fear they would be used against the Kurds. This time, · 
however, he said he was "delighted" at the deal. Yet the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union 
recently passed a resolution calling for a complete halt to 
all ·arms sales to Indonesia. 
The British government gave further support to Suharto at 
the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) of donor 
countries and organisations. While several countries reduced 
their aid commitments for the coming year, Britain pledged 
250 per cent more in aid, offering £81 million, the largest 
percentage rise given by any country. 
The increase was met with derision in the House of Lords. 
Leading the debate was Lord Judd, Opposition spokes-
person on overseas aid: "Will the minister come clean? Is 
this not a sad story in which trade and arms export interests 
have taken precedence over human rights? ... When will the 
government change their rhetoric into tangible, effective 
pressure on the regime?" [Hansard, 21.Vll.93]. For the 
government, Baroness Chalker argued that British aid was 
'helping the poor in Indonesia'. The truth lies somewhat 
nearer home. The government's declared policy is to con-
sider a country's human rights record when deciding on aid. 
When it comes to Indonesia, however, there has always 
been a readiness to ignore this. 
Business interests 
While the UK's higher aid commitment was dressed up as 
a reward to Indonesia for pursuing a tight fiscal policy and 
reducing poverty levels, it is in fact a promotion for British 
economic interests in Indonesia. A growing proportion of 
British aid to Indonesia is made up of Aid and Trade 
Provisions (ATP) - concessionary loans and mixed credits 
for the purchase of British goods. ID 1991/2, around half 
was ATP. This year, 80 per cent will be ATP in the form 
,.jof a £65 million concessionary loan for the construction of 
a power station in East Kalimantan, to be contracted to 
British companies. East Kalimantan is where major mining 
projects will need a plentiful power supply. Kaltim Prima 
Coal, which will double its output over the next few years 
for the export market, is half owned by a subsidiary of 
British Petroleum. The Kelian gold mine, operated· by an 
Australian subsidiary of the British RTZ company, plans to 
divert the Kelian River to exploit its recent discovery of 
gold reserves. 
The power sector is one of several sectors to which Aid 
and Trade Provisions have been channelled. It is also one 
in which, the Department of Trade and Industry says, 'there 
are continuing good prospects for trade'. British Gas has 
just won a contract to instal a generator in Serpong, West 
Java, where a 72-hole golf link is no doubt making heavy 
demands on the region's power supply. 
The other area targeted by Britain's ATP is Indonesia's 
communications infrastructure, such roads, rail, radio, 
bridges and airports. British exports to Indonesia are 
dominated by compon~nts for such projects: heavy machin-
ery, transport and power generating equipment. 
Improving a country's infrastructure is a sure way of 
laying the groundwork for foreign investment. The other 
ingredient - political stability - is something which the 
British government has put much effort into developing. 
Selling ground-attack aircraft to a military regime not only 
strengthens its oppressive might, it serves as a public 
symbol of what Britain usually does through silent diplo-
. macy, sending a clear message of support for the nature and 
power of the Suharto regime. 
TAPOL's JO-page ba&grounder: 'UK: the British Per-
spective' is available for £1 including postage. 
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Protests against arms deals 
Protests against the British Hawks deal and the German warship sale resulted in several direct actions. 
In San Francisco, a demonstration was held outside the Indonesian consulate to protest against US 
arms deals with the regime in Jakarta. 
The protest in Germany was unique. A coalition of peace 
groups joined by Watch Indonesia in Berlin launched direct 
action to halt the sale of 39 warships. The organisers named 
the action Timor und kein Trupp (No mess in East Timor) 
and the Whitsun weekend became the date of the rally. The 
ships, sold at rock-bottom prices to the Indonesian Navy, 
are harboured at the Peenemunde harbour, the site where 
Hitler built his Vl and V2 rockets. 
Cheap but dear 
The 39 warships, two-thirds of the former East German 
Navy are being sold off cheap but US$ 327 million will be 
invested to refurbish the ships with high-tech communi-
cations equipment and sophisticated weaponry. Germany 
will also supply Indonesia with 3 new submarines, each 
costing US$ 400 million. All told, the project to upgrade 
the Indonesian Navy will cost around US$ 2 billion. 
According to the German government's communique, the 
ships will be used in Indonesian waters against pirates, 
drugs dealers and mine-sweeping, but the protestors high-
lighted the aggressive character of -the Jakarta regime 
(examples: Aceh, East Timor and West Papua) and the 
plight of many Acehnese refugees who fled across the 
Malacca Straits after persecution by the Indonesian army. 
Peaceful, well-organised action 
Hundreds of protestors from Berlin and Peenemunde 
attended the peace rally. For three days four corvettes and 
a landing ship were occupied by demonstrators and be-
decked with slogans and banners stating: Freedom for East 
Timor, A New Europe, New Hope, No warships to East 
Timor, Germany - accomplice to Genocide, etc. The 
preparaiions -were good and the police were caught 
unawares. The campaign was peaceful and on the third day 
the protestors left the ships voluntarily. Media coverage was 
impressive and as the organisers put it: 
Once again it showed that the government in Bonn is not 
prepared to take responsibility for promoting human rights, 
but carries on supplying dictatorships with arms while 
infringing its own laws. On the other hand, we succeeded 
in_ denouncing this disgrace to German politics. We devel-
oped effective resistance - by nonvi.olent means - to inform 
the public and disrupt the arrogant complacency of the 
political powers in Germany. Our feast of peace was an 
invitation to intervention. We shall continue with it. 
The anti-Hawks campaign 
On 11 June, the day after the announcement of the Hawks 
deal, the Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), TAPOL, 
CND, Blacksmith and Arrow demonstrated at the Ministry 
of Defence in Whitehall. A letter was delivered by Nick 
Harvey MP and representatives from the demonstration. The 
following week, a demonstration touring all the relevant 
offices _ in central London was organised by Arrow. 
The occupation of German corvettes 
_ Another demonstration calling for the cancellation of the 
Hawks deal is planned outside the office of British Aero-
space at 1 Brewer's Green, Buckingham Gate, London on 
Indonesia's independence day, 17 Angus~, 12 noon - Spm. 
TAPOL urges readers to write to their MPs to protest 
against the Hawks deal with the Prime Minister and the 
Foreign Office. The £500 million deal will need substan-
tial help in its financing. An agreement with the govern-
ment's Export Credit Guarantee Department may not 
yet have been made. • 
HAWKS FOR 
THE HAWKS 
British 
warplanes 
help with 
Indonesian 
repression 
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An unfortunate diplomatic blunder 
Suharto's relations with US presidents Reagan and Bush were always cosy. The Suharto-Clinton 
relationship may be on a collision course. The forty-minute meeting between the two during the G7 
summit in Tokyo, for which Suharto had lobbied so hard, turned into an occasion for yet more 
embarrassments over East Timor. 
The meeting between the two presidents had been on the 
cards for months. Suharto was obsessed with a desire to be 
invited to this year's G7 summit as the honorable chair of 
the Non-Aligned Movement {NAM) representing more than 
100 countries. Two ministers, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas 
and Research Minister Rudy Habibie, were dispatched to 
the G7 capitals to plead for an invitation. From the outset 
Suharto's chances to attend the summit were bleak. When 
the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl visited Jakarta some 
months ago, he conveyed the message that Suharto was 
welcome to meet G7 summiteers individually but not be 
part of the summit agenda. 
Alatas versus Moerdiono 
Suharto is nothing if not stubborn. To attend the summit 
would be the climax of his presidency. It was only after 
strenuous efforts that he had become chair of NAM which 
spurred him on to ever higher goals. Indonesia's tarnished 
global image has been something he has had to bear for far 
too long - the Santa Cruz bloodbath in November 1991 and 
the killings in Aceh have been widely reported interna-
tionally. 
G7 members had hinted that it would be embarrassing to 
receive a human rights violator like Suharto but these 
signals were ignored by Suharto and he relentlessly pressed 
his case for an invitation to Tokyo. 
Major-General (ret'd) Moerdiono, Suharto's Secretary of 
State saw things differently and felt that Suharto was being 
made to look as if he was grovelling in front of the world 
leaders. On several occasions Moerdiono declared that the 
Tokyo visit was unlikely to happen. But Foreign Minister 
Ali Alatas took a different approach; so much had been 
invested in making the Tokyo visit a fact that a cancellation 
would be a slap in the face for Suharto. When he eventually 
had to swallow defeat, Suharto decided to accept Alatas' 
advice and meet some G7 leaders privately. Alatas was 
skilled enough to make it look good: ''We never asked to 
participate in the G7 meeting'~ he said, adding that it 
would be "more efficient" to address all the G7 leaders at 
once. In the end Suharto was received by tbe host Miyaza-
wa and made a courtesy call on Helmut Kohl. His only 
proper meeting was with Bill ainton. 
US Senate and Mickey Kantor 
Jakarta was more or less prepared for a showdown with Bill 
ainton. There had been many warnings from Washington. 
The Indonesian press was hinting that human rights would 
be on the agenda. US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor 
had announced that the US was suspending GSP benefits 
(exemption from duties on certain imports) for Mauritania 
while GSP privileges for Indonesia were placed under 
review because of concern about workers' rights and 
freedom of assembly. Indonesia was given eight months' 
notice to improve, or else face sanctions. Earlier this year 
Suharto sent a mission to Washington to argue against such 
a decision but to no avail. The suspension of GSP benefits 
will cost the Indonesian economy annually around $400 
million. 
In Tokyo, Alatas invited Mickey Kantor to send a mission 
to Jakarta to review Indonesian labour laws in order, as he 
put it, "to remove some lingering misconceptions". 
Another even bigger headache was East Timor. Before his 
Tokyo trip Clinton received a letter signed by 43 senators 
from both parties, urging the president to raise US concerns 
about the situation in East Timor. It became unavoidable 
that human rights would be raised. When the meeting took 
place, each side was well represented. Suharto was accom-
panied by Moerdiono and Ali Alatas, NAM coordinator 
Nana Sutresna, Economic Advisor Prof. Widjoyo Nitisastro 
and Head of the American desk at the Indonesian Foreign 
Ministry, Irawan Abidin. Bill Clinton had with him Nation-
al Security Advisor Anthony Lake and his deputy Sandy 
Berger, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and his 
Assistant, Winston Lord, along with National Security 
Assistant Sandra Kristoff. After the meeting the Indonesian 
team went straight to Haneda airport to return home. 
Silent diplomacy turns sour 
Following the encounter, the Clinton team kept its cool and 
disclosed little apart from generalities. Whatever Clinton 
had said was not for public consumption which is not 
uncommon in matters of high-level state meetings. But it 
was Suharto who decided to go public. The private TV 
channel RCTI, owned by Bambang Suharto, later broadcast 
footage of a tense and angry president giving his version of 
the meeting. He had told Clinton: "Indonesia is very 
sensitive concerning the issue of human rights" because of 
"our experience of 350 years under colonialism, where our 
human rights were trampled by the coloniser". 
What exactly President Clinton said about East Timor is 
shrouded in secrecy but we know what Suharto answered, 
namely that Indonesia's involvement with East Timor was 
motivated solely by a desire to help the majority of its 
population. "/told him {Clinton) that we accepted the East 
Timor integration because we respect the human rights of 
the majority of East Timorese'~ said Suharto adding that 
Indonesia had neither territorial nor economic interests in 
East Timor. 
Whatever happened clearly stung East Timor's tormentor 
and marks a further shift in Washington towards a more 
interventionist stand. * 
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East Awin problems explained 
Robert Shunanek's article, summarized in Bulletin 117, shed light on the appalling conditions at the 
East Awin refugee site. Correspondence recently received by TAPOL from the site confirms the severity 
of these conditions, and the desperation and frustration felt by many refugees. 
The two demonstrations at East Awin at the beginning of 
1993 signalled serious frustration among the refugees. On 
25 January, demonstrators hoisted the West Papuan flag in 
place of that of the UNHCR. On 3 February, representatives 
from the Warastone and Blackwater camps at the site 
presented a petition to the UNHCR and the PNG author-
ities. Looting broke out. 
Since 1984, the Australian government has been providing 
funds for food and medical care, to be administered by the 
UNHCR through the Provincial Affairs Department of PNG. 
But according to our source, neither food nor medical care 
is being provided. The refugees are increasingly expected 
to live off the vegetables they grow in their gardens. But 
the soil is poor, and what they can sometimes grow - sweet 
potatoes, watermelons, cucumber and bananas - is lacking 
is essential proteins. Because of this, and as no basic 
necessities are supplied, the refugees sell their garden 
produce in Kiunga, so as to buy rice, sugar, salt, kerosene, 
cooking oil, soap, toothpaste and clothes. 
Niogamban refugee camp, photo: Jan Kakarere 
But getting to Kiunga involves a long trip by truck and 
river. The trucks belong either to the UNHCR, the 'fruit and 
vegetable business' (funded by an EC Joan) or the Refugee 
Business ~ociation (RBA - financed by a grant from the 
Netherlands). All charge high fees: a return trip to Kiunga 
with a small cargo costs some $13. This is more than what 
a family will spend on provisions, doubling the cost of what 
they buy. This is what sparked the demonstrations and 
looting at the beginning of the year. TAPOL's correspon-
dent gives three reasons for their anger: 
• the funds for the RBA truck were given to the refugees 
as humanitarian aid, not for a business project; 
• there is no other way for the refugees to earn money; 
• as political and not economic refugees, their status should 
be recognised and their freedom of movement guaranteed. 
The UNHCR 
The main grievance concerns the UNHCR, which is said to 
be developing East Awin as a business project, not for 
human development. Furthermore, the UNHCR never takes 
a close look at conditions in the camps, so does not know 
what the refugees need. The exception is when there is a 
programme of repatriation. "Whom [it] does not repatriate, 
the UNHCR [does] not visit", wrote our source. 
The UNHCR was due to close its office in Port Moresby 
in July. So where does this leave those it has a mandate to 
protect? The refugees at East Awin live in a vacuum of 
information. No one knows what their needs are, and they 
know nothing about their future. "We have not been told 
anything. We have not seen any sign of the future, but we 
have seen repression of refugees' basic rights." * 
Refugees repatriated 
District head of Merauke, West Papua, Raden Soepardjo, 
must have had his frustrations relieved in May when 2126 
West Papuan refugees who had fled to PNG last year after 
clashes between the OPM and Indonesian security forces, 
were repatriated to Merauke. Soepardjo had scorned the 
UNHCR earlier this .year for protecting the refugees in 
PNG. 
The repatriations were carried out by the UNHCR, the 
PNG Department of Village Services and Provincial Affairs 
with aircraft of the Missionary Aviation Fellowship which 
operates in West Papua. The ICRC has said that, despite the 
closure of its office in Jayapura, it will continue its work in 
West Papua, and so presumably monitor the safety of the 
returnees. Indonesia's treatment of the ICRC in East Timor 
in recent months, however, casts considerable doubt over its 
ability to do so. ir 
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~~~'ff ~~WI~ Update 
A news diary servtce on West Papua sponsored by the Australia .West Papua Association (AWPAJ 
P.O. Box. 1148 Collingwood 3066. Australia Number 15. June 1993 
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New transmigration plans for West. Papua 
Jn the mid 1980s, international criticism of Indonesia~ transmigration programme seemed to have had 
some effect, and the programme was slowed down or left to people to migrate spontaneously. But plans 
to flood West Papua with government-sponsored transmigrants are again gathering momentum. 
The pace of development Indonesia is planning for West 
Papua will require a 100 per cent increase in the population, 
according to the new Transmigration Minister, Siswono 
Yodohusodo. Contemplating the abundance of unexploited 
natural resources in West Papua, Siswono suggested that the 
present population density of four people per square 
kilometre made development inefficient. The ideal density 
would be 400 people per square kilometre, he said [Jakarta 
Post, 2.VI.92]. 
West Papua has always been a prime target of the pro-
gramme. The government's original goal was to move 
hundreds of thousands of families there from Indonesia's 
crowded inner islands. But the programme became the butt 
of criticism from environmental and human rights groups. 
The colonisation of West Papua through transmigration has 
been detrimental not only to the culture and livelihood of 
its indigenous peoples but also to the environment which 
they now have to share with Javanese migrants. The latter 
have themselves suffered from poor facilities, including 
basic supplies such as water. 
By the late 1980s, the official programme had slowed, in 
apparent recognition of its sensitivity. But Siswono's recent 
assertions make no bones about the government's plans. The 
new governor, Jacob Pattipi, is keener on the programme 
than his predecessor. He recently discussed transmigration 
with President Suharto, who proposed that the movement to 
West Papua be stepped up to help solve acute manpower 
shortages. The districts of FakFak, Sorong and Manokwari 
were identified as suitable locations. (Sorong already has 
209,000 hectares reserved for transmigration, and Manok-
wari, 225,000 hectares.) All the areas are subject to large-
scale investment projects requiring extra labour: while 
FakFak is home to the enormous Freeport copper and gold 
mine development (see separate article), and Sorong the 
location of a huge Kayu Lapis pulp milJ, Manokwari has 
been identified by Siswono for its potential in marine, 
agricultural and plantation products, in particular the 
country's largest area of sago palms: fish and shrimp farms 
are already a big source of exports from the region. 
Another area targeted for agro-industry is Merauke, where 
the transmigration sites are typical of the scheme's failure. 
Having suffered drought and the inability to grow rice, 
many transmigrants have returned to Java. But according to 
Siswono, "it is not impossible for Merauke to become the 
rice-bowl of Irian Jaya, because it has a river which could 
irrigate 100 milJion hectares of rice fields." The Transmi-
gration Department estimates that, if a large dam were built 
on the Digul river, the area could accommodate 100,000 
transmigrant families. 
The magnitude of Governor Pattipi's transmigration plans 
is breath-taking. He has announced that in the next five 
years the province will receive 52,000 families (some 
210,000 people). As if that weren't enough, he wants the 
government to increase the number fivefold to 52,000 
families a year in the next five years! Until last year, West 
Papua had received altogether 42,611 transmigrant families>~ 
Freeport's pollution exposed 
Local tribal leaders are holding Freeport Indonesia responsible for the recent outbreak of disease near 
its copper and gold mines in West Papua. The third largest mining operation in the world, Freeport~ 
is planning far bigger things for the fUture. 
Sympathy for Mimika-Amungme people 
The Mimika-Amungme Community (SMAC) have accused 
Freeport of destroying the local environment; they link the 
river pollution caused by the company to outbreaks of skin 
disease and diarrhoea, and an increase in the number of 
miscarriages around its mining area. 
Denying the accusations, a Freeport director alleged that 
poor hygiene awareness among the people was the more 
likely cause of the diseases. Freeport invested in a public 
relations drive when it realised last year that resources were 
going to keep it there for at least another 30 years. The 
company portrays itself as the great benefactor of health 
and well-being in West Papua, with impressive pro-
grammes in education and community health care. 
Freeport's Adrie Machribie even claims that these diseases 
are widespread in Irian Jaya, and are not restricted to 
villages close to the river affected by its mining operation. 
Arguing that the town where the rise in miscarriages has 
occurred is 30km from the Ajkwa river, he says it could not 
have been caused by Freeport's activities. 
Anyway, according to Machribie, Freeport is only dis-
carding tailings which have a characteristic indistinguish-
able from natural sediments carried in the rivers while tests 
of the river water carried out by the firm revealed no excess 
of hazardous metal which might cause the diseases. 
Government investigations support the Freeport view, 
claiming that the rise in miscarriages may be caused by 
poor nutrition, the mothers' young age or venereal diseases. 
Sedimentation 'just like nature' 
About 95 per cent of the 60,000 tons Freeport processes 
each day is dumped into the rivers in the form of tailings. 
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Freeport's President-Director Hoediatmo Hoed admitted that 
dumping increases sedimentation in rivers but said that 
since the same thing happens naturally it does not harm the 
environment. [Jakarta Post [7.VII.93). However, build-ups 
of sedimentation have been causing severe problems for the 
local people, including the flooding of their sago plains 
from the Ajkwa river into which the tailings are dumped. 
Reports last year that these waters had been dangerously 
contaminated were vigorously attacked by Freeport's public 
relations machine. 
In response to SMAC's charge that the company employed 
too few Papuans, Hoediatmo said that Freeport preferred to 
employ local people, but their skills were inadequate. He 
pointed out that Freeport is helping a government-run 
training centre and provides scholarships to Irianese 
(Papuans) to study at universities. Freeport currently 
employs some 12,000 people, of which around 1,500 are 
Papuan. 
Freeport's new world 
Freeport's plans to expand its processing capacity by 50 per 
cent to 90,000 tons per day involve building a new town for 
20,000 people. Situated north of Timika on the road to 
Tembagapura, the company town will occupy 7,000 
hectares of Amungme land between the Ajkwa and lwaka 
rivers. Consisting of apartments, shops, and a school, it will 
share the utilities already installed for the company's 
workers living in Timika. [t is envisaged that the two towns 
will eventually merge. [Suara Pembaruan, 7. VII.93). 
Pattipi, West Papua's new governor, must be pleased. An 
influx of 20,000 people would fulfil half of his ambitious 
new annual target for transmigration to the territory! * 
Moi people's plea for world action 
As their forests continue to be felled, the Moi people continue to protest. But negotiations with the 
government and the company have reached a stalemate. Their desperation was expressed recently in 
a request for international support about their situation, despite the danger more publicity might bring. 
The Moi have been protesting about the activities of PT 
Intimpura since 1991, when it first became clear that their 
needs and wishes were being ignored. An agreement with 
[ntimpura in June 1992, stipulating forms of cooperation 
between the two parties has been repeatedly ignored, 
precipitating a series of attacks by Moi people on the 
company's facilities. 
In a typical blanket response to any indigenous voice 
raised in West Papua, the authorities responded to the latest 
clashes by claiming it was carried out by 'security disturb-
ers' (the official term for OPM members). When protesting 
villagers got involved in a punch-up with officials in April, 
they were told, "No land is owned by Moi people; land is 
owned by lrian Jaya - Maluku Military Command, Kodam 
8", and this is the reality in more ways than one. There are 
nine senior army officials with interests in another company 
working on Moi lands: Kayu Lapis, one of Indonesia's 
powerful conglomerates owning several subsidiaries with 
timber concessions in West Papua. 
A previous clash between the Moi and PT Intimpura was 
in November when 14 Moi villagers were arrested. These 
men were recently released. But now three other Moi 
villagers face murder charges for the death of a policemen 
who died in Moi territory. The Moi have denied responsi-
bility and point to the fact that he was in a sacred site when 
he died. 
The strains of the struggle are beginning to show. The 
Yolom Fai team appointed by the Moi to negotiate with the 
logging company and the government are under intense 
pressure: followed every day, they are too afraid to com-
municate with their own people. Consequently, the Moi 
have become suspicious of them. 
Transmigration 'gift' 
A report in the Jakarta Post suggests that the Moi people 
have handed over 20,000 hectares of land for a transmigra-
tion site. Villagers in several subdistricts of Beraur are said 
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to have waived compensation for the land so long as their 
people are allowed to resettle on it under the state-spon-
sored transmigration programme. In light of the tenacity 
with which the Moi have kept up the struggle for their land, 
such a report is hard to believe. Nearly 30,000 trans-
migrants have settled in the Sorong regency during 1993. 
(Jakarta Post, 22.V.93) * 
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Woman strike leader murdered in East Java 
A woman activist named Marsinah has been murdered in East Java after being involved in a strike at 
a watch-making factory. Her death has inspired a country-wide campaign of protest and solidarity 
and calls for an end to military intervention in labour disputes. 
Marsinah who was in her early twenties was found dead in 
a forest about two hundred kms from the factory where she 
worked. She must have been in the hands of her assassins 
for three days. Her body was covered with bruises and a 
large implement had been thrust into her vagina, proving 
that she \vas violently tortured by her assassins. 
Staunch defender of workers' rights 
Marsinah was known to her colleagues as a fearless 
defender of workers' rights at the factory in Surabaya where 
she worked, ·PT Catur Putra Surya. The strike action was 
similar in most respects to the numerous strikes that have 
swept through the industrial heartland of Indonesia, mainly 
in West Java but spreading recently to East Java. All the 
ingredients are there, low wages, no democratic union and 
direct and heavy-handed military interference which, many 
fear, may have been the factor leading to her tragic death. 
Marsinah had finished high school. Close relatives and 
friends speak of her as a hard-working student who was 
continuing her studies while holding a job at PT CPS, 
taking courses in computer operation and English. 
The dispute at PT CPS was over the failure of the 
company to raise the basic wage in accordance with a 
regulation issued by the governor of East Java. To press 
their demand for an increase, workers went on strike on 3 
May. On the next day, they held a demonstration outside 
the factory but were kept away by security forces that had 
been called in to protect the premises. Later that day, 
negotiations were held between workers' representatives 
including Marsinah, officials from the company, the local 
Manpower Office and the local military commands. There 
was a heated discussion during which Marsinah was 
particularly vocal. 
On the following day, 5 May, 13 workers involved in the 
action were summoned to Kodim, the local military com-
mand, and held there for the day. Marsinah made many 
attempts to check on their whereabouts, After spending 
some time that evening with her work-mates discussing the 
latest developments, Marsinah left, saying she would take 
a meal on the way home. Her friends never saw her alive 
again. For several days they could discover nothing about 
her but it later transpired that her body was found in a 
woodland in Nganjuk, some 200 kms from the factory and 
that she had died on 8 May. 
Company profile 
PT CPS produces a variety of goods but mainly concen-
trates on manufacturing many brands of watches. About 70 
per cent of output is exported. It has a workforce of five 
hundred, of whom three hundred are women. They are paid 
a basic wage of Rp 1,700 [less than U$1] a day plus Rp 
200 an hour for compulsory overtime. They are required to 
pay for some of the working tools they use and the protec-
tive gloves they wear. There is no polyclinic on the prem-
ises and pay is deducted whenever a worker visits a nearby 
clinic in case of illness while at work. 
The workers have twelve demands, the first being an 
increase in the basic wage from Rp 1, 700 to Rp. 2,250 an 
hour. Others include increased allowances for transport and 
meals and the provision of medical treatment, paid men-
strual leave according to government regulations, as well as 
a guarantee that workers involved in actions will not be 
dismissed. The workers also want the factory branch of the 
SPSI, the government-sponsored union, to be disbanded. 
The Surabaya Legal Aid Institute has found that 71 per 
cent of factories in and around Surabaya pay less than the 
official minimum wage, while only 13 per cent of com-
panies throughout East Java have collective agreements 
with their workforce. Unable to press their demands for 
improved wages and working conditions, more and more 
workers are going on strike. [Surya, 17.VI.1993) 
Solidarity campaign gathers momentum 
The murder of Marsinah sent shock-waves through the 
human rights network in Indonesia and has rallied solidarity 
actions on an unprecedented scale for workers. The murder 
has been widely reported in the local and national press, 
some newspapers even publishing editorial comments on 
the affair. 
Dozens of non-governmental organisations (NGO) and 
leading human rights activists have joined the Solidarity 
Committee for Marsinah (KSUM) in a campaign for (1) the 
establishment of an independent team to investigate her 
murder and make its findings public, (2) firm measures 
against anyone involved in her murder and (3) guarantees 
from the authorities that no pressure will be exerted on her 
family during their investigations into her death. 
The Arek Foundation in Surabaya is planning a series of 
major actions in many cities throughout Java as well as in 
Bali and Sulawesi during July and August. These will 
include protest statements, boycotts and street demonstra-
tions. 
On the 40th day after her death, a huge gathering took 
part in a solemn and emotion-charged ceremony. 
The campaign has also taken up the fate of the thirteen 
workers who were summoned by the military on the day 
Marsinah disappeared. The thirteen have been dismissed by 
the company, apparently at the insistence of the army. The 
KSUM has called for the re-instatement of the thirteen and 
has caJJed for a ministerial i:egulation promulgated by the 
Minister of Manpower in 1986 [Kep.342/MEN/1986] which 
allows the military and the police to intervene in labour 
disputes to be withdrawn. 
The provincial police and military have initiated a murder 
inquiry and claim to have 1racked down the vehicle that 
was used to transport her body to the place where it was 
discovered. However, they have refused to contemplate any 
independent investigation. The involvement of the security 
forces in her killing is wideJy suspected. * 
See also, "We'll make mince-meat of them" on page 15. 
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Aceh 's tragedy exposed by Amnesty 
Amnesty International, Indonesia: "Shock Therapy'~ 
Restoring Order in Aceh, 1989-1993, JuJy 1993, 68 pp. 
At a time when analysts are suggesting that the Suharto 
regime is becoming more open, discarding its militarist 
image and assuming a 'gentler' mien, it is salutary to read 
this account of what has happened in Aceh during one of 
the most blood-thirsty campaigns waged by the Indonesian 
army since it took power in 1965. With Suharto these days 
being depicted as more conciliatory towards dissidents, it is 
sometimes forgotten that the Indonesian armed forces have 
not changed. They can be unleashed at any time on a J:1egion 
that dares to challenge army rule from the centre. 
The publication of this report, at a time when news from 
Aceh is even rarer than usual, should come as a reminder 
to the international community of the horrors through which 
the Acehnese have lived since the army went on the 
rampage in the most northerly tip of the regime's far-flung 
empire to crush the liberation movement there. 
This is the first major report Amnesty has produced about 
Aceh and it must rank as one of the best documents it has 
produced on Indonesia's many crimes. Coming to the issue 
for the first time, the report provides an excellent summary 
of the historical, political and social roots of the emergence 
of a liberation struggle that has provoked the unbridled 
wrath of the Indonesian armed forces. The measured tone 
in which it discusses Aceh Merdeka leaves the reader with 
no doubt that Acehnese people have wed their sense of 
historic destiny to the many grievances they harbour against 
a regime that exploits their natural resources with scant 
regard for the interests of the local population. 
The account of the army's operation against Aceh, directed 
not only against the armed guerrillas but in particular 
against defenceless civilians, is a powerful indictment of 
Indonesian militarism at its most brutal. The counter-
insurgency campaign launched in 1989 and intensified in 
the latter part of 1990, subjected the region to an orgy of 
killings, 'disappearances', torture, mass arrests, enforced 
recruitment of the population, the use of 'vigilante' thugs 
and forced confessions, that have succeeded in terrorising 
the population. If anyone has doubts about the militaristic 
character of the Suharto regime, let them reflect on what 
the Acehnese have suffered. 
Much of the evidence for this assessment comes in 
statements made by army officers themselves. "If they don't 
do as you order them, shoot them on the spot or butcher 
them, " said regional military commander Major-General 
H.R. Pramono, "/ tell members of the community... (i)f you 
meet a terrorist, kill him. " The same officer also denied 
reports of a mass grave with two hundred bodies. "The 
grave certainly exists but I don't think it could have been 
20(} bodies. It's hard to tell with arms and legs all mixed 
up." 
The use of shock therapy in the title of the report comes 
from no less an authority than President Suharto himself. 
This was the term he used to explain the objective of the 
'mysterious killings' carried out by death squads in 1983 
and 1984. By drawing a comparison with that gruesome 
campaign and also with the killings that swept through 
Indonesia in 1965 and 1966, Amnesty portrays the Suharto 
regime as having a deep-rooted killer instinct, whenever it 
feels that the 'national stability' of its unitarian state is under 
Indonesian troops on patrol in Banda Aceh 
threat. Officers like Major-General H.R. Pramono and those 
under him who have terrorised the people of Aceh abound 
among the present crop of senior officers who now occupy 
positions as regional commanders and commanders of 
special units like Kostrad and Kopassus. 
Although the level of killings in Aceh has fallen in the 
last year or so, Amnesty argues that this is no cause for 
complacency. 'The relative ''peace and order" which now 
prevails in Aceh and the decline in the overall number of 
human rights violations reported, does not reflect any 
significant change in the policies or practices of the 
Indonesian security forces. On the contrary, it appears to 
reflect a continuing and pervasive fear of government 
retribution... Under the circumstances, a pattern of grave 
and widespread violations may quickly re-emerge in the 
event of renewed opposition to Indonesian rule. ' 
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